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The expansion of international trials over the last decades has reinvigorated the debate 
surrounding the efficacy of retributive justice over restorative justice in response to mass 
humanitarian crises.  This study examines the ways different transitional justice models 
contribute to stable peace.  It suggests that a hybrid utilization of both restorative justice 
mechanisms (e.g., amnesty) and retributive justice mechanisms (e.g., trials) is most 
effective in achieving a stable peace in a post-accord state, and that context is an 
important intervening factor.  Using a mixed method approach, I first examine a group of 
25 test cases, analyzing the relationship between restorative and retributive justice and 
post-conflict stability.  I then examine more closely the paradigmatic case studies of El 
Salvador, Rwanda, and Mozambique in order to see how the three dominant models 
worked within individual country contexts.  While the data suggests some linkage 
between the hybrid model and post-conflict stable peace, there are intervening factors 
(such as culture, alignment of narratives with elite and popular interests and values, and 
international legitimacy), which are also at work.  
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The large number of liberation, post-colonial, and post-Cold War internal conflicts over the past 
decades, and the mass killing and human rights abuses that have accompanied many of them 
have led to a debate concerning the efficacy of different sorts of transitional justice (TJ) 
mechanisms as states adapt to a new reality after undergoing violent conflict.  A country which 
has faced mass humanitarian crises – crimes against humanity, genocide, or war crimes – usually 
must bear the weight of how to bring peace to its citizens while at the same time utilizing 
mechanisms of justice to restore law and order and punish perpetrators of crimes.  This debate 
has centered around the question of which justice mechanisms are more likely to produce 
sustainable peace – those mechanisms which seek reconciliation through forgiveness or amnesty  
without a strict form of trial punishment (i.e., “restorative justice”) or those mechanisms which 
promote accountability for past wrongdoing, most often through trials (i.e., “retributive justice”).   
While the universal norms of international law to honor the protection of human dignity 
and the common good are central to any discussion regarding human rights and TJ, there are a 
variety of ways in which further mechanisms are utilized to punish unjust aggressors and work 
towards sustainable peace and reconciliation in a given society. Some proponents of international 
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trials, which are charged with prosecuting criminals of mass crimes across borders, dismiss 
movements of reconciliation and amnesty—restorative means of justice—as the modicum for a 
culture of impunity.   Skeptics of these tribunals, however, often highlight the importance of 
amnesty for ending violence and garnering reconciliation, and claim that trials—the surest form 
of retributive justice—may make it more difficult to achieve peace (Lyons, 2012).  Yet such a 
debilitating separation often neglects the reality that faces most post-conflict states.  Not only do 
means of amnesty and reconciliation remain important factors in convincing parties to participate 
in peace accords, but trials also add a legitimizing force to the peace efforts while addressing 
past wrongs committed by perpetrators.   
 This article examines which mechanisms – restorative or retributive, or a hybrid form of 
both – are most efficacious in sustaining peace and stability in a post-conflict State, and the 
degree to which country-level contextual factors affect the type of mechanism that is chosen and 
its effectiveness in producing sustainable peace.  Paradigmatic case studies then shed light on 
how and why particular mechanisms work, and in what contexts--lending support to the 
argument that there is not one automatic prescription for effective transitional justice, although 
there is at least some tentative evidence that incorporating multiple mechanisms that balance 
between retributive and restorative justice increases the likelihood of sustainable peace.  Rather, 
I argue that the most important factors influencing TJ design and effectiveness are local context, 
political interests, and the mobilization of persuasive narratives that resonate with society.   
This study is important because much of the debate concerning post-conflict States 
focuses either on retributive justice or restorative justice, without taking into consideration 
hybrid institutions that incorporate elements of both models.  Many of the best-known studies 
that have addressed the combination of mechanisms have focused on outcomes like 
improvements in democracy or human rights practices, rather than peace or stability.  Moreover, 
because the study of TJ in domestic and international contexts is organic, this article will 
contribute to the growing research in this field, and will produce useful policy implications for 
institutional designers and international organizations.   
 
Theorizing transitional justice 
 
The presence of international tribunals in the fight for international justice in response to 
genocide, war crimes, and humanitarian offenses, has recently been the subject of a significant 
cluster of literature examining their efficacy, legitimacy and normative importance as 
international interventions.  International actors and state leaders alike have questioned their 
efficacy in consolidating democratic transitions and peace.  Underneath such discussions, 
however, is a pressing empirical dilemma:  do tribunals used to judge war criminals (especially 
of mass humanitarian atrocities, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes) help 
to foster stable peace in the longer term – or do they inhibit it? William Zartman (2005: 1) points 
out that “Attempts to bring current combats to an end may interfere with efforts to bring the 
entire conflict to an end and prevent its future reemergence.  The contrast between the terms, 
‘peace’ and ‘justice,’ where both are necessary but one is often possible only at the expense of 
the other, reflects this potential contradiction.”  Even after a peace agreement has been reached, 
efforts to ensure accountability and build institutions capable of ending impunity in the future 
(by showing that aggressors have been punished) sometimes undermine the momentum for 
cooperating on a shared national project, which can disrupt security and stability as spoilers 
turned off by the ‘hard’ aspects of TJ use this as an excuse to resume fighting. Additional 
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questions arise about how this balance is managed during the negotiations themselves.  Much of 
the debate has focused on this question.   
Much of the literature involved in analyzing stable peace and the efficacy of different 
international TJ mechanisms falls into three theoretical camps, which can be organized following 
the categories proposed by Wenzel et al (2008): 1.) retributive justice, or holding those 
responsible for killing and human rights violations accountable through trials and other judicial 
or criminal processes; and 2.) restorative justice, or allowing amnesties and a focus on 
forgiveness to exempt past participants in conflict from individual accountability, usually in 
order to make it possible to reach a peace agreement and end combat.  3.) In addition to the 
categories developed by Wenzel et al, I also highlight the large number of studies that unpack the 
grey areas between these two extremes by proposing hybrid models that includes elements of 
both accountability and forgiveness (and often truth). 
  The following section elaborates on the three major theoretical schools in order to 






Some scholars (Akhavan, 2001; Rosenberg, 1996; Mendez, 1997) have argued that TJ is best 
fostered by institutional mechanisms that hold accountable those who have transgressed 
international norms regarding human rights or mass killing.  These authors claim that the 
presence of such trials is a better predictor of success than amnesty or truth commissions, and 
thus fall into the first camp. They argue that in the period since the 1970s, the norm of 
international accountability has proliferated, and as a result of this ‘justice cascade’, the use of 
trials has grown much faster than other mechanisms, and has been more successful (Lutz and 
Sikkink, 2001; Sikkink and Walling, 2007).[1] This camp is openly “optimistic” about the 
efficacy of international justice accountability mechanisms (such as trials or international war 
tribunals),  holding that tribunals can serve to consolidate peace within a state affected by mass 
humanitarian crimes, either serving as a deterrent to rogue individuals within the State, or 
offering a mechanism for victims to cope and move on with the peace process.  
The first theoretical camp – favoring retributive justice mechanisms – finds significant 
support in the current human rights literature.  Payam Akhavan (2001: 9) argues this position, 
claiming that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have contributed to peace as these two post-
war societies rebuilt themselves by bringing in criminal accountability to domestic and 
international culture.  He notes that “Both institutions have helped to marginalize nationalist 
political leaders and other forces allied to ethnic war and genocide, to discourage vengeance by 
victim groups, and to transform criminal justice into an important element of the contemporary 
international agenda.”  Rosenberg (1996) falls into a similar camp, arguing that peace is fostered 
when nations (in addition to individuals) seek to understand traumatic past events before they 
can transition to normalcy.  Accountability through international criminal justice, Rosenberg 
argues, helps victims heal and prevents the return of dictatorships. Former President Ricardo 
Lagos of Chile, who rejected an amnesty for top leaders from the Pinochet dictatorship that was 
established in the Chilean constitution and affirmed by a previous truth commission, recalls why 
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he sought to ensure accountability and truth, despite the risk of reviving latent resentment and 
conflict: "It was a very difficult decision – will you open the problems of the past, or will you 
face the past as it was? When I appointed the commission I said – 'there is no tomorrow without 
yesterday.' You have to look back to look forward." [2] 
Richard Goldstone (2007: 7), a former Justice of the Constitutional Court of Africa, 
argued the “optimistic” position, that criminal tribunals have made peacemaking through 
negotiations more attainable. He claims that the indictment of Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb 
politician accused of war crimes against Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s, was instrumental in 
allowing for peace negotiations in Dayton to commence, which resulted in the end of the 
Bosnian war in 1995:  “There was no way that President Izetbegovic or any other Bosnian leader 
would have considered being in the same room as Karadzic in November of 1995. So the 
indictments assisted in bringing an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  This practical 
application and personal testimony reinforces the retributive justice approach.  In cases like 
Colombia, the presence and active engagement with the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
actually helped to shape the substance of the negotiated peace accords as well as specific policies 
of the Colombian government related to peace and accountability for ex-combatants (Rincón et 
al, 2019) 
 Juan Mendez (1997: 266) offers evidence against the so-called positive effects of 
amnesty and impunity in order to bolster the case for accountability.  He notes, “It is far from 
proven that a policy of forgiving and forgetting automatically deters future abuses. In fact, at 
least in Haiti one can more easily make the case that the opposite is true: each self-amnesty by 
the military has only led to further interruptions of democracy and to further atrocities.  This 
deference to democratically elected leaders, who supposedly know better than anyone what is 
best for their country and what the traffic will bear, is unwarranted.”  He also uses the case of 
Guatemala in the mid-1980s, in which amnesty only allowed President Vinicio Cerezo and his 
military to commit even more violations of human rights.  This argument is typical of this camp 
in its conviction that any peace agreement that does not include measures of accountability is 




The second theoretical camp favors 'restorative' justice mechanisms over retributive justice 
mechanisms.  These scholars  (Scharf, 1996; Graybill, 2004; Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002) 
argue that trials inhibit peace, and stable peace is sustained through mechanisms such as 
amnesty, falling into the second camp.  They find that cases of forgiveness (amnesty) and 
impunity are just as likely, if not more likely, to propel a transitional state toward democracy, 
arguing that tribunals are costly, distrusted, and sometimes counterproductive.  Snyder & 
Vinjamuri (2004) argue, “Preventing atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will frequently 
depend on striking politically expedient bargains that create effective political coalitions to 
contain the power of potential perpetrators of abuses (or so-called spoilers). Amnesty—or simply 
ignoring past abuses—may be a necessary tool in this bargaining. Once such deals are struck, 
institutions based on the rule of law become more feasible.” The United States State Department 
has argued that this insight should be incorporated into practice in reference to international 
justice, and that accountability policies must be balanced against the need to move on and 
encourage armed groups to disarm and reintegrate into society (Scharf, 1996). 
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 The studies in this camp range from legal defenses of amnesty to empirical examinations 
relying on large-N datasets or case studies that conclude that retributive justice does not improve 
peace, human rights practice, or democracy.  Scharf (1996: 59) argues that the practice of 
granting amnesty for crimes against humanity is not necessarily in defiance of international law.  
He claims that the “practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation 
under customary international law to refrain from conferring amnesty for [these massive] 
crimes.”  Scharf cites as evidence that at the same time as the term 'crimes against humanity' was 
coined, amnesty was offered simultaneously to the Turkish perpetrators of the Armenian 
genocide of the twentieth century, a historical precedent which shows that international law does 
not obligate states to utilize tribunals.     
 A study of attitudes within a nation regarding TJ, focusing on Rwanda, South Africa, and 
Mozambique, finds that the cases in which states favored reconciliation over tribunals were 
unexpectedly successful in achieving peace (Graybill, 2004).  The author attributes this outcome, 
at least in part, to factors related to cultural context, in which the adversarial legal system 
developed largely in Western countries and reflected in the retributive approach to international 
law, may not resonate appropriately within some non-Western cultural contexts.  This is an 
important observation that this study will build on, especially in the analysis of two of these 
same cases, plus an additional case representing hybrid forms of both mechanisms. 
 Fletcher and Weinstein (2002: 575) note that international criminal mechanisms bear no 
inherent relationship to building peace in a transitional democracy.  In fact, they argue that trials 
undermine broader domestic peacebuilding by focusing exclusively on legal cases: “The 
significant limitations of justifying trials as symbols are that the focus on legal processes may 
divert attention from the multiplicity of symbolic efforts helpful to establish the credibility of a 
new regime.” Burdening TJ trials with symbolic meaning may interfere with the ability of 
judges, lawyers, and juries to produce legitimate verdicts. 
 In the Center for the Study of Human Rights debate referenced earlier, Leslie Vinjamuri 
(2007: 11-12) argues that in situations where institutions are too weak to ensure effective 
implementation, or where the political will of powerful actors supporting trials is absent, war 
crime trials are typically ineffective.  She argues that “in the face of ongoing conflict, war crime 




A final, third theoretical camp (David and Yuk-ping, 2005; Bell, 2006) analyzes the complex 
interactions between the positions of the previous two types of TJ mechanisms, arguing that the 
evidence is not strong enough to suggest that only one mechanism (amnesty or tribunals, for 
instance) can adequately predict the consolidation of stable peace.  This is not simply a moderate 
“in-between” position, but a more complex synthesis, which recognizes that both goals 
(peacemaking and justice) must be balanced and present simultaneously.  The ‘justice balance’ 
approach advanced by Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) argues that a holistic approach that 
combines trials and selective amnesties (and sometimes also truth commissions) is more 
effective in improving democracy and human rights practices than either amnesty or trials alone.  
The current article further develops this insight and seeks to evaluate it against a different 
outcome: sustainable peace over time. Extending the argument beyond improvements in 
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democracy and human rights, I seek to explore the impact of a holistic 'justice balance' hybrid 
approach on the maintenance of stable peace. 
In addition to those advocating for combining elements of retributive and restorative 
justice, other contributions to the hybrid model approach emphasize that any one-size-fits-all 
approach is destined to fail.  These scholars argue that different contextual factors – such as 
culture, historical legacies, and trust in international organizations – are key elements of a more 
complex theoretical model, and that 'one-size-fits-all' prescriptions are unlikely to be very 
helpful.  They are also aware of the potential for unexpected variations due to local context.  
Alexander Hinton (2010: 1) argues that, “However well-intentioned, transitional justice needs to 
more deeply grapple with the messiness of global and transnational involvements and the local, 
on-the-ground realities with which they intersect, complexities that are too often glossed 
over….”   David and Yuk-ping (2005) argue that individual reparations through international 
criminal justice are successful only if coupled with broader socio-political efforts at domestic 
democratization.  Using a large-N study of survey data from former political prisoners in the 
Czech Republic, these authors found that reparation is a two-dimensional process that 
incorporates both changes in social and political reconstruction as well as internal psychological 
healing by victims.  They argue that different societies may have different understandings of 
concepts of justice, healing, reconciliation and forgiveness.  Thus, an understanding of the 
relationship between trials, peace negotiations, and their role in fostering sustainable peace must 
also consider these relative, cultural and sociological presuppositions.  This critique, coupled 
with the concern of some scholars that the issues underlying TJ are far too complex for 
quantitative data alone (Bell, 2006), have led us to design a multi-method study that incorporates 
some quantitative comparisons in addition to brief case studies that unpack some of the 
contextual factors that affect the interaction of different TJ mechanisms.     
 While a great deal of literature studying democratization and human rights improvements 
has focused on TJ mechanisms, several key questions remain:  why do some states, affected by 
massive humanitarian crises, utilize retributive justice mechanisms, such as international 
tribunals, while others utilize restorative justice mechanisms, such as amnesty?  Which 
mechanism, or combination of mechanisms, is likely to lead not only to human rights 
improvements, democratization, or negotiations, but also to longer-term sustainable peace and 
stability?  Most importantly, why, and in what contexts does the institutional design have this 
effect?  This article seeks to contribute to the literature by addressing this set of questions.  In 
particular, it posits that post-conflict states that utilize complementary methods of restorative and 
retributive justice are somewhat more likely to engender sustainable peace and stability than 
post-conflict states that utilize either retributive or restorative justice alone.  More importantly, a 
more detailed analysis of three paradigmatic case studies sheds light on the contextual factors 
that influence which TJ mechanisms are selected in a given country, and under what conditions 
they are likely to lead to sustainable peace.  The most important of these contextual factors that I 
analyze are whether there is a match between elite and popular interests, the availability of 
symbols and narratives that can be mobilized by institutional designers, and the relative share of 
blame for the conflict by the parties in the conflict. 
 
Evidence from cases 
 
This section examines the effects of three different types of TJ mechanisms across a medium-N 
set of states that have undergone violent conflict.  I measure the average degree of political 
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stability and lack of violence characterizing states that utilized retributive, restorative, and hybrid 
models of TJ.  I draw upon an existing data set to measure political stability (a proxy for 
sustainable peace), operationalized by Kaufmann, et al. (2003) and compiled by Breuning and 
Ishiyama (2007). [3] Additional indicators of sustainable peace are drawn from the Human 
Security index, including its Peacefulness sub-index.  In order to determine whether a state used 
restorative justice, I use the Peace Accords Matrix database, published by the University of Notre 
Dame. [4] This database identifies cases where amnesty was used.  I draw on the Transitional 
Justice Database Project to examine where domestic or international trials were used over a 
number of cases. [5]  
The second part of the empirical section goes into more detail for three post-conflict 
country cases to examine the factors involved in helping to maintain peace (or not).  This 
qualitative analysis provides richer insights into intervening factors within specific country 
contexts, seeing which mechanisms within retributive justice, restorative justice, and the hybrid 
model contributed to the greatest amount of stable peace and why this was so. Mozambique 
serves as the paradigmatic case for restorative justice, Rwanda for retributive justice, and El 
Salvador for the hybrid model.   
 The outcome I am most interested in with this study is stable peace.  This variable is 
operationalized through an index of variables measuring political stability of a given post-accord 
state.  I use one of the six dimensions of the governance index calculated by the World Bank and 
utilized by Kaufman, et al (2003) to measure political stability and absence of violence.  The 
definition of political stability in this index refers to “perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism” (Kaufman 2010: 4). [6] The measure is based on many 
underlying variables that reflect perceptions of a wide range of governance issues, using surveys 
from firms and individuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks, as well as 
multilateral aid agencies. As an additional check on the dependent variable, I also analyze the 
relationship between different TJ mechanisms and alternative measures of peace: the 
Peacefulness Index and the Human Security Index. [7]  
 The first factor examined in this study is utilization of retributive justice.  This is 
measured using data from the Transitional Justice Database on international or domestic 
tribunals.    Trials are further assessed based on their frequency.  Countries that initiated more 
than 5 trials are classified as “High Trial,” countries that initiated less than 5 trials but more than 
2 are classified as “Medium Trial,” countries that initiated fewer than 2 trials are classified as 
“Low Trial,” and countries that initiated no trials at all will be classified as “No Trial”.  The 
Transitional Justice Database categorizes those post-conflict states that experienced some form 
of international or domestic criminal trial. 
 The second factor to be examined is utilization of restorative justice.  This will be 
operationalized using both the Peace Accords database as well as the Transitional Justice 
Database, which lists all issuances of amnesty from 1970-2007.  This variable will reflect two 
factors:   whether or not formal amnesty was involved in a comprehensive peace agreement and 
whether truth commissions were used.  Formal amnesty will be assessed on four levels: No 
amnesty, low amnesty, medium amnesty, and high amnesty.  Countries which had 10 or more 
issuances of amnesty are classified as “high amnesty,”; countries with 5-10 issuances as 
“medium amnesty,” those that had less than 5 issuances as “low amnesty,” and countries which 
had no issuances as “no amnesty”. [8] The indicators of restorative justice are listed in Table 1 as 
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two separate measures (i.e., amnesty and truth telling body or commission).  Truth commissions 
are assessed at the binary level:  namely, whether or not any truth commission was utilized.  The 
Peace Accords database defines amnesty as “a legal guarantee that exempts former combatants, 
rebel leaders, and/or government officials from liability for criminal or political offences 
committed during the conflict.”  The Accords database defines truth and reconciliation 
mechanisms/truth commissions as follows:  “A temporary body established and officially 
sanctioned to investigate and report on patterns of human rights abuses occurring over a period 
of time in a particular country or in relation to a particular conflict.”  The Peace Accords 
database traces post-conflict States that have experienced some form of a comprehensive peace 
agreement involving amnesty and truth-telling since 1989. 
 The third factor to be examined is utilization of a hybrid of retributive and restorative 
justice.  This will be operationalized at the binary level—namely, whether or not both measures 
of retributive justice and restorative justice were utilized together.  If both mechanisms were 
utilized, the case will be listed as a hybrid; if only one was utilized, it will be listed as not a 
hybrid.     
 The data summarized in Table 1 below compares the political stability of States that have 
emerged from conflicts or humanitarian crises with the existence of mechanisms of restorative 
and retributive justice.  On the one hand, for the majority of “middle cases” of post-conflict 
states with a medium political stability, there is nothing significant concerning whether solely 
restorative, solely retributive, or some hybrid of the two was utilized.  In fact, across most levels 
of political stability, there does not seem to be any trend in whether higher levels of either 
restorative or retributive justice contributed more to sustainable peace.  Yet, looking at the more 
radical cases of political stability – the most and least stable post-accord states – there is an 
apparent trend.  For the five states with the highest levels of political stability, all but one 
(Mozambique) utilized the hybrid model of restorative and retributive justice.    Likewise, for the 
5 states with the lowest levels of political stability, there is a similar pattern.  All but one (Serbia 
and Montenegro) did not utilize the hybrid model.  Interestingly, of the lowest three countries on 
the scale (Burundi, Tajikistan, and Angola), none had trials, but all had some level of amnesty.  
In comparing countries with hybrid forms of TJ and those without hybrid forms, the mean value 
for all three indices--political stability, peacefulness, and human security--is greater for countries 
utilizing hybrid TJ mechanisms than for those without them. [9] Given the small sample size, 
these effects are significant at the .10 level of significance using a one-tailed T test, so the 







































High* Yes Low Yes 
3. Morocco -0.06 0.384 0.606 Medium No Medium Yes 
4. Nicaragua -0.10 0.436 0.540 High* No Medium Yes 







Low* No None No 
6. Philippines -0.19 0.146 0.535 High No Low Yes 
7. Armenia -0.33 0.277 0.666 Low No None No 
8. Russia -0.55 -0.037 0.645 Medium* No Low Yes 
9. Peru -0.58 0.231 0.629 Medium No Medium Yes 










Medium Yes Medium Yes 
13. Georgia -1.08 -0.133 0.646 Low No None No 
14. Chad -1.16 -0.225 0.409 High* Yes None No 
15. Uganda -1.21 -0.135 0.453 Medium* No Low Yes 
16. Iran -1.24 -0.134 0.603 Medium* No Low Yes 
17. Rwanda -1.26 -0.021 0.423 Low* Yes High Yes 
18. Indonesia -1.27 -0.065 0.584 Medium Yes Medium Yes 
19. Nigeria -1.38 -0.269 0.447 Medium No Medium Yes 
20. Somalia -1.50 -0.442 0.296 High Yes Low Yes 
21. Dem Rep 
of the Congo 
-1.52 
-0.415 0.350 
Medium* No None No 




Low* No High Yes 
23. Burundi -1.68 -0.368 0.396 Medium* Yes None No 
24. Tajikistan -1.87 -0.246 0.550 Low No None No 
25. Angola -1.99 -0.329 0.460 High* No None No 
 
Table 1. Political stability (1997-2005) and TJ mechanisms among post-accord states whose 
conflicts ended after 1980 
 
*Indicates whether general amnesty was granted (i.e., “Amnesty for all X, whether political, military, 
rebels, or general populace").  Sources: Kaufmann, et al. (2003); Breuning and Ishiyama (2007); Human 
Security Index; Transitional Justice Database; Peace Accords Matrix.   
 
Going beyond a binary view of hybrid TJ or not, one can construct a TJ index that assigns a 1-3 
value for low/medium/high trials and (reverse coded) amnesty, plus a binary variable for the 
presence of truth commissions (an indicator of restorative justice).  This TJ index results in a 
value between 3 (most restorative) and 8 (most retributive). In Figure 1 on the nest page, the 
cases from the table above are analyzed, comparing the TJ index with their average 
stability/peace score over the 10 years following their transitions (or as close as is possible with 
the existing dataset).  The relationship shows generally greater levels of political stability and 
peace over time for the countries with middle-range scores on the transitional justice index, with 
those having more extreme retributive or restorative scores having generally lower levels of 
political stability and peace.  Given the small sample size, these effects are not statistically 
significant and should be taken as suggestive trends. 
 
10 Jeffrey Pugh 
 
Figure 1: Average political stability/peace over 10 years compared with TJ index score 
 
The preliminary comparative analysis suggests that there is some relationship between 
sustainable peace and the utilization of both restorative and retributive justice, although the 
tentative strength of the relationship seems to caution against a one-size-fits-all policy 
prescription.  There need not be an inherent dichotomy.  While this study does not purport to say 
that all cases that combine restorative and retributive justice lead to sustainable peace, the data 
do suggest a link between the utilization of the hybrid model and political sustainability of peace.  
In the next section, the article will examine paradigmatic cases for the three types of TJ 
mechanisms, examining the causes behind sustainable peace or the lack thereof.   
 
 
Illustrative case studies of the three models 
 
In this section, I examine in greater depth three cases that illustrate the three major approaches to 
TJ outlined above.  Although El Salvador, Rwanda, and Mozambique have very different 
historical, regional and cultural contexts, all three were sites of intense internal conflict during 
the late 1980s or early 1990s, and they all ended around the same time, near 1994.  None of the 
three cases have reverted to armed civil war since the conflicts ended in the 1990s (although of 
course many forms of structural and criminal violence and human insecurity persist). The 
variations in the forms of TJ that they employed at the end of the conflict help to shed light on 
the factors and process through which different mechanisms are selected and implemented, and 
which influence the effectiveness of TJ in leading to sustainable peace in the country.  Figure 2 
on the next page illustrates the changing levels of political violence in the three countries during 
and after their internal conflicts by comparing the Political Terror Scale score, a 5-point index 
calculated by Gibney et al (2015) on the basis of Amnesty International reports.   
 




Source: Political Terror Scale score--Amnesty Intl (Gibney et al 2015)  
 
Figure 2: Comparing the three cases over time on political violence 
 
As the data shows, El Salvador's level of political violence dropped dramatically in the years 
immediately after its conflict ended, although it spiked a couple of times in the 2000s, especially 
leading up to election years.  Rwanda's political violence score, on the other hand, remained 
rather high for the remainder of the 1990s, then dropped significantly at the beginning of the 
2000s and remaining low.  Mozambique's political violence score lowered moderately and 
inconsistently following the end of the conflict, and has risen somewhat again in the latter part of 
the 2000s.  Of the three cases, El Salvador's decrease in organized political violence seems most 
directly tied to the transition that ended the war, whereas the other two cases seem to have 
improved their peace and security over a longer time frame, and possibly for other reasons than 
the design of transitional mechanisms (such as improving economic performance). [10] 
Figure 3 on the next page shows the relationship between the three countries using the 
political stability score from the Governance Indicators of Kaufman et al (2014 update), 
available between 1996 and 2013.  This also shows Rwanda recovering over a much longer time 
frame while El Salvador and Mozambique fluctuate over the 2000s (the fact that data are not 
available for the early 1990s is unfortunate, since this would likely better reflect the effects of the 
transitional justice process on Mozambique and El Salvador's stability and peace, given that their 
transitions happened earlier than Rwanda). 
El Salvador was a country that utilized both restorative and retributive TJ measures, and 
ranked high on the list of sustainable peace in the previous section.  Thus, I examine this country 
as an example of a hybrid model.  For the first mechanism—retributive justice—I examine 
Rwanda, which scored the highest for the amount of criminal tribunals in a country.  While 
Rwanda also utilized some means of amnesty (especially in an earlier episode of conflict during 
the 1970s, as opposed to the genocide of the 1990s) and truth telling, the amount of criminal 
tribunals outweighs the score for amnesty, which is far lower. [11] For the second mechanism—
restorative justice—I examine Mozambique, as the paradigm for restorative justice.  Although 
Mozambique did not use a hybrid model of restorative and retributive justice, the country 
nevertheless ranked in the top 5 of politically sustainable post-conflict States.  I examine this 
counterexample in greater depth to flesh out the importance of context and political prudence for 
the effectiveness of TJ mechanisms, and as a warning against ‘one size fits all’ approaches. 
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Source: Kaufman et al 2014 
Figure 3: Comparing the three cases over time on political stability/sustainable peace  
 
El Salvador:  The hybrid model 
 
I first examine in greater depth the case of El Salvador, a country that scored in the top five for 
political stability, and employed a hybrid TJ model that used both mechanisms of restorative and 
retributive justice.  During some of the worst conflict years in El Salvador (1980-1991), many 
human rights abuses centered around the  abuse and violent terror shown toward civilians, 
especially in human rights organizations and the Catholic Church, which was targeted by serious 
repression (Montgomery, 1995).  As Cath Collins (2006: 726-727) points out, “Many of the most 
emblematic human rights violations of the war involved the violent death of prominent church 
figures, such as the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the 1981 rape and murder 
of four US churchwomen, and the 1989 killing of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her 
daughter...In such circumstances legal responses could not and did not take root as primary 
responses to human rights violations in El Salvador.”  Yet this lack of judicial structure did not 
prevent El Salvador from later utilizing criminal trials in the aftermath of such wide-reaching 
human rights abuses.  In fact, the truth commission in El Salvador that followed the end of the 
war recommended the investigation and removal of the military officers responsible for the worst 
human rights violations, which ultimately led to unprecedented levels of accountability for very 
high-level officials and officers.  According to Charles Call (2002: 397), "the consequences of 
the Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions' reports signaled the most thorough housecleaning ever 
carried out of a Latin American military not defeated in war."   
 El Salvador implemented six amnesty laws, launched a truth commission that issued a 
public report, and conducted trials in four different years for wartime human rights abuses.  In 
the aftermath of these hybrid forms of TJ, El Salvador's human rights and security record did 
improve significantly, as illustrated in the decrease in the Political Terror score in Figure 1.  In 
fact, across the region, the existence of trials positively contributed to the change in Political 
Terror score—typically from higher levels of terror to lower levels.  Sikkink and Walling (2007: 
442) compare El Salvador and other Latin American countries that had both amnesty/truth-
telling and trials, with countries that had trials, but no truth commissions.  Their conclusion is 
that, “In Latin America, countries that choose to implement both trials and truth commissions 
seem to have better human rights practices than countries that choose to use fewer alternatives.” 
Moreover, their study also debunks claims of the restorative camp that trials actually prolong 
conflict and human rights abuses, concluding that “in Latin America, the advocates of trials do 
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exacerbate conflict or threaten democracy; and that amnesties cannot be proven to be deterrents 
[by themselves] to future human rights abuses … [many] countries have held both truth 
commissions and human rights trials.” (Sikkink and Walling, 2007: 442-443)   
 Going beyond national security and peace at a political level to human security and the 
experience of peace at an individual level, El Salvador also experienced a drastic decrease in the 
homicide rate, which was reduced by some 70% over the five years immediately following the 
peace accords that ended the conflict.  Although El Salvador continues to have one of the highest 
homicide rates in the world and suffers from serious gang violence, it is notable that the rate has 
decreased compared to what it was, as seen in  
 
 
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics database 
 
Figure 4: Homicide rate in El Salvador 
 
El Salvador's combination of different mechanisms was relatively successful for several reasons.  
The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), an effective guerrilla movement at war 
with the military, maintained substantial support in El Salvador, as well as from international 
actors.  This international attention and support for conflict resolution efforts, combined with 
greater internal legitimacy and capability of the FMLN, put pressure on the government to 
negotiate and make meaningful concessions, especially after it was linked with serious human 
rights violations by death squads of civilian and church leaders (Pugh, 2009). El Salvador also 
was the subject of significant international attention, with the UN playing a crucial role as a 
mediator and observer, and in providing technical assistance.  Because of the international 
significance of this UN assistance, the credibility of the truth commission was enhanced within 
the country, with public opinion polls reflecting widespread acceptance of its report.  The truth 
commission also demonstrated its credibility and independence by naming high officials in the 
army as being responsible for the murder of Jesuit priests in 1989, and blaming Roberto 
D'Aubuisson, one of the founders of the ARENA political party, for helping to form death 
squads and planning the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, providing impressive levels of 
evidence to corroborate its accusations (Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, 1995).   
 The commission went out to peasant communities and interviewed victims’ whose voices 
were never heard, which added legitimacy and a breadth of scope to the commission’s efforts.  
The El Salvador case was also paradigmatic in that it “named names” in order to avoid 
impunity—it made sure that the people of El Salvador knew exactly who was responsible for 
crimes.  The peace accord itself also recognized that perpetrators were not immune from legal 
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prosecution.  Even if trials were not as frequent as amnesty, they were still implemented in 
tandem with the other mechanisms. 
 El Salvador also attempted to balance between preventing impunity by holding 
wrongdoers accountable and achieving an efficient and quick transition by applying retributive 
justice selectively.  Instead of reforming functional institutions of justice, Salvadorans “confront 
a need to totally transform the structure of government…focusing on immediate judicial and 
political reform,” according to Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (1995: 102).  Ruben Zamora, former 
presidential candidate for the leftist FMLN/CD/MNR coalition, recalled that the decision to 
tackle deep social justice and institutional reforms in the peace agreement, rather than focusing 
only on a cease-fire, was an important way that accountability was built into the transition in a 
way that would address root injustices.  He also claimed that, despite some evidence of fraud in 
the democratic elections that he lost in the aftermath of the transition, he decided to continue 
supporting the process within the new system, because a degree of restorative justice and 
forgiveness was necessary to consolidate the fragile new democratic institutions. [12] These dual 
recollections illustrate the hybrid nature of El Salvador's justice balance. 
 Thus, in the case of El Salvador truth-commissions were key alongside trials and 
amnesty.  This was due in part to international legitimacy, the efficiency of the commissions, and 
the public approval of the commissions.  The people of El Salvador generally desired some form 
of accountability, without impunity, and a quick transition and overhaul of less-than-adequately 
functioning political and judicial structures.  At the same time, the acceptance of governance 
authority, the demobilization of the guerrilla forces, and the good offices of ONUSAL, the UN 
verification mission, helped to facilitate peacebuilding and prevented escalating feuds based on 
retribution.  El Salvador remains a paradigmatic case for a country that had a large shift in 
political terror, which utilized a hybrid model of restorative and retributive justice.  This brief 
case study has offered a handful of reasons why this was so.   
 
Rwanda:  Retributive justice through human rights trials 
 
For the case study of a country that received one of the highest trial scores, Rwanda provides a 
useful exemplar.  Although Rwanda did utilize limited amnesty, the country retains the highest 
score for trials, and is a paradigmatic case for a focus on retributive over restorative justice. 
 One of the worst genocides in recent decades, the Rwandan conflict claimed 800,000 
lives at the hands of over 200,000 perpetrators.  The civil war centered around radical extremists 
of the Hutu clan who blamed the minority of Tutsi civilians for the country’s social, political, 
and economic problems.  There was also a widespread belief among Hutu that past abuse and 
discrimination from the Tutsi needed to be rectified by efficient and violent means.  The civil 
war and genocide came to a conclusion when the RPF (Tutsi dominated rebel group) defeated 
the Hutu fighters in 1994 (Genocide, 2012). 
 The Rwandan political context following the conflict was significant, as there was 
pressure to hold those responsible for the genocide accountable to ensure that it never happened 
again.  The fact that the conflict ended largely through military victory rather than through a 
negotiated pact also meant that the ‘winners’, the RPF and the government of Paul Kagame, 
could (and needed to for their political legitimacy) push for ‘maximal accountability’ that 
penetrated to all levels of society, and not only to top leaders.  Despite pressure from the 
international community to follow the South African model and focus more on restorative justice 
that would include some form of amnesty and truth commissions, the Rwandan government 
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focused its TJ efforts mostly on the retributive side, and international responses mostly followed 
suit.  Trials and tribunals were initiated at multiple levels: the national judicial system 
aggressively prosecuted genocide perpetrators, and when it was obvious that it did not have the 
capacity to try the hundreds of thousands of potential cases, a local-level process was devised 
through the gacaca courts to have community leaders try the accused. [13] Finally, an 
international tribunal was initiated to address war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide—namely, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  According to its 
statute, the ICTR was designed to complement the domestic judicial process by prosecuting 
those responsible for genocide, mass killing, and crimes against humanity during 1994, both 
within Rwanda and in neighboring countries, since quite a few atrocities were orchestrated from 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other bordering territories (UNICTR, 2012).    
At its outset, however, the Rwandan delegation to the United Nations was skeptical of the 
proposition. The delegation argued that the ICTR’s temporal limitations would prevent 
accountability for those involved in planning the genocide before the beginning of the year 1994, 
and that unlike the Rwandan criminal justice system, the ICTR statue did not allow for the death 
penalty to be imposed as a sentence (Fink 2005).  Thus, while the international community 
maintained that judicial intervention was necessary, the Rwandan government was not in 
agreement about exactly how this should be directed within the country.  A dichotomy of opinion 
and skepticism of international powers were present—two things which were not as prominent in 
the El Salvador case. 
 The ICTR was seen by some as an “imperial gesture,” which did not allow Rwandan 
society to come to terms with a proper method of reconciliation, taking into account specific 
societal and cultural constructions.  Instead, Jason Fink (2005: 123) notes, “its retributive 
orientation is directed toward rectifying the injury sustained by an abstract, a-historical and 
luminal subjectivity and is not able to address the needs for social reintegration marking 
Rwandan’s dualist post-genocidal society.”  Such factors largely contributed to the perceived 
lack of legitimacy that the international tribunal endured. 
 Because truth commissions were not widely used in concurrence with trials in Rwanda, 
and there was not much foresight given to the specific cultural and societal characteristics of the 
State, Rwanda had a harder time translating international efforts into local-level reconciliation, 
and moving toward inclusive and sustainable peace.  For certain situations, trials work well—but 
when they are not coupled with some form of truth telling, reconciliation, or amnesty—that is 
restorative justice—they tend to neglect distinct cultural and societal needs.  Fink (2005: 130) 
notes, “The legal process of arriving at issues of individual guilt, as such, may be inappropriate 
under certain types of dualist post-genocidal societies,” like Rwanda.   
 In contrast to this critical view of Rwanda's retributive justice approach to TJ, other 
observers defend the focus on accountability.  Genocide survivor Bukumura Egide dismisses the 
pressure from some sectors for a more restorative approach in Rwanda. "I see the way they 
postpone things and if there is no immediate justice in Rwanda, if there is no truth, if there is no 
trial proceeding, and if there is no clear punishment, which is an important foundation then I can 
assure that there will be no unity."  Pointing out the limitations of the 'confession' and 
community reconciliation components of the gacaca courts in particular, he argues,  
 
How can one force someone to ask for forgiveness? Because one admits his or her 
mistakes and later asks for forgiveness after realizing that he or she really did 
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wrong. But in our case, people are forced to ask for forgiveness, yet in reality they 
[perpetrators] don’t even accept that they killed. That act may later on lead 
Rwanda into problems. Another thing is the perpetrators are the ones who are 
catered for. The survivors are not remembered, no one talks for them [survivors]. 
The government and gacaca court are biased. If the gacaca court does not work in 
transparency, they will not reconcile people. (Aegis, 2014) 
 
A report by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) provides 
a more robust defense of the potential for the gacaca courts to achieve accountability more 
effectively than the overburdened national courts, while also introducing elements of community 
participation and truth telling that could potentially lead to reconciliation more than generally 
occurs through court trials.  It argues, "there seem to be a number of real-world reasons that may 
render the human rights and criminal law violations embedded in the gacaca process less 
devastating than may appear, either because there are few real-world alternatives, or because the 
process can be argued to constitute a locally appropriate, and popularly legitimate, form of 
justice, with a higher potential for contributing to reconciliation (Uvin, 2003: 119)."  This report 
was written near the beginning stages of the implementation of the gacaca experiment, but later 
analyses agreed that gacaca was more effective than the ICTR or domestic court trials 
(Gasanabo, 2019).    
 Other analyses of the system's results critically portray the use of the gacaca courts—or 
local, participatory legal mechanisms seeking a hybrid form of restorative justice and especially 
retributive justice—as ineffectual.  Max Retting (2008: 45), for example, argues that such courts 
were really not helpful at all, from either a retributive or restorative situation: “Gacaca’s punitive 
model raised the stakes of participation and provided the opportunity for individuals in the 
community to use gacaca as a mode of personal revenge.”  Retting also claims that there is 
considerable evidence that gacaca did not eradicate distrust in the community, but in fact, 
exacerbated it, due to the damaging relationship between the people and authorities. 
 Thus, in the case of Rwanda, unlike El Salvador, there was not an effective mechanism 
for truth-telling or reconciliation, and the international tribunals were often seen as a top-down 
imperial imposition, and not a truly domestic effort on behalf of the Rwandan people.  Even the 
gacaca court experiment, which meant to be both retributive and restorative, often failed to 
adequately address the underlying social distrust and polarization which impeded genuine 
healing and reconciliation.  They were seen by many people on the ground as an imposed 
solution that often advanced the political interests and grievances of local and central 
government officials more than promoting genuine social integration. 
 
Mozambique: Successful restorative justice without trials? 
 
This section analyzes Mozambique, a unique case that ranks in the top 5 post-conflict states 
experiencing stable peace, and yet only utilized reconciliation and amnesty. Mozambique is an 
interesting case because it actually suffered two major armed conflicts: the first was a bitter 
liberation war against Portuguese colonialism from 1964-1975.  Following independence, the 
Mozambican FRELIMO government implemented a program of trials and retributive justice 
against the 'comprometidos' accused of collaboration with the Portuguese.  This campaign, 
named "‘let us not forget the past’, set out to ‘transform the compromised based on the 
presumption of guilt, repentance, punishment and re-education’." (ICTJ 2008: 36)  This 
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aggressive pursuit of retributive justice did not succeed in transforming social relations within 
the country, and simmering conflict eventually erupted in 1978 in what would become a fifteen-
year civil war between the socialist FRELIMO government and the RENAMO rebel insurgency. 
A peace accord was signed in 1992 which prompted elections in 1994; yet, as Graybill (2004: 
1125) notes, “Despite the fact that one million civilians were killed, thousands tortured, and 
some of the most horrendous acts of barbarism were committed, there were no calls for justice, 
punishment, or accountability.”   
 Unlike Rwanda, which pursued international and domestic criminal trials, there was a 
definite decision to avoid such retributive mechanisms in Mozambique (Cobban, 2007).  Andrea 
Bartoli, an active participant in the talks as a member of the Community of Sant'Egidio, a 
Catholic organization which helped to facilitate the peace process, recalls several reasons for 
this.  First, neither the RENAMO insurgency leaders nor the FRELIMO government was 
interested in playing the 'justice game' or pointing fingers, since both were implicated in 
atrocities during the war and had their share of dirty laundry.  Second, there was a genuine war 
weariness and fear among the mass population of anything that might restart the war.  The 
dominant narrative blamed the war itself as a collective trauma, rather than focusing on blame 
for a particular party or individuals.  Third, because Mozambique had only recently gained 
independence from colonial Portugal, and the new government was immediately contested by 
internal guerrilla fighting, there was never a chance to consolidate a legitimate, widely trusted 
rule of law and governing institutions.  For that reason, 'accountability' measures that would 
involve government-run trials were not attractive to a mass public having little experience with 
state institutions that they trusted. [14] Bartoli argues,  
 
Although human rights were always in the background of all talks, no truth 
commission was established to address RENAMO's prior violent activity, and no 
provisions were made for indicting or prosecuting war criminals.  The text of the 
agreement represented the reality that Mozambicans wanted peace more than they 
wanted retributive justice.  Mozambicans preferred to accept those involved in 
horrible war crimes into their own communities again rather than follow the 
Western-oriented way of dealing with the consequences of war.  Very soon they 
started blaming the war--not RENAMO or FRELIMO--for the suffering that had 
marked the life of the country. (Bartoli, 1999: 265) 
  
The interests of political elites to avoid a damaging retributive justice process were translated 
into a narrative that resonated with the cultural and symbolic repertoires of the mass population 
by employing a discourse of forgiveness, of healing, and by legitimizing the decentralization of 
local, non-state approaches to reconciliation, especially through civil society and religious actors.  
In Mozambique's unique cultural context, blame and revenge were seen as inimical to a society 
seeking to move on.  Instead, traditional healers, called “curandeiros,” were responsible for 
“defusing the cultures of violence the war had wrought” through rituals, ceremonies, and local 
healing processes (Graybill, 2004: 1125).  These ceremonies reflect a very communal 
atmosphere in Mozambique, in which reintegration processes for victims and reconciliation were 
seen as keys to political and social success. The fact that Mozambican society is predominantly 
Christian [15], and that Catholic leaders played a significant role in facilitating the peace process, 
means that shared religious beliefs represented a powerful set of principles on which to establish 
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social reconciliation processes requiring trust and a shared vocabulary of healing and peace.  
According to an ICTJ (2008: 43) report, the avoidance of trials and retribution and the emphasis 
on forgiveness was seen as necessary for political and social healing, and was legitimized as 
spiritually and psychologically healthy. As Honwana (1999: 30) argues, “recent studies of war-
affected populations in Mozambique show that talking about traumatic experiences does not 
necessarily help patients to come to terms with their distress.”  In fact, in some instances, it 
might add to that distress.  Reconciliation is viewed most essentially between the living and the 
dead—one must cut one’s links with an evil past, and not continue to over-analyze what has 
already ended (Graybill, 2004).   
 Amnesty worked within the social and cultural context of Mozambique because the 
discourse of forgiveness resonated with broadly shared principles within society, and because 
this narrative provided a frame for action that met the political interests of mutually implicated 
former fighters and governmental elites while also responding to the fear among the population 
of re-igniting a destructive conflict. As an exception to the general finding that hybrid forms of 
TJ seem to produce more sustainable peace than cases that rely exclusively on restorative or 
retributive forms, Mozambique provides an important case to understand the social construction 
of peace and the role that specific cultural and political contexts play in influencing the 
effectiveness of different TJ mechanisms.  Although systematic studies measuring the outcomes 
of different mechanisms across cases are very useful, Mozambique serves as a cautionary 
example of the limitations of broad generalizations across cases, and the importance of 
understanding the social and political interactions within cases.  A more expansive, integrative 
and locally contextualized approach to determining what effective transitional justice looks like 




At the outset, this study sought to understand a phenomenon which plagues any post-conflict 
State:  how does a country deal with past atrocities?  Much of the contemporary literature on this 
matter has focused on a dichotomy between retributive and restorative justice, often neglecting 
the hybrid forms that fall between these two models.  Even the growing number of studies that 
do consider the value of 'hybrid' models often seek to establish generalizable conclusions about 
their effectiveness or ineffectiveness in producing a variety of outcomes, including improved 
human rights, democracy, and security.  While this is a worthwhile endeavor, and more 
systematic empirical work is certainly needed (Thoms et al, 2010), there is a real risk of 
oversimplified policy recommendations when TJ theories ignore the social/historical context and 
the internal political incentives of particular cases in favor of blanket recommendations or 
rejections of a specific mechanism, like trials, amnesty, or truth commissions (Ben-Josef Hirsch 
et al, 2012).  
 The data from the medium-N comparison of post-conflict cases reinforces the 'justice 
balance' conclusions of Olsen et al (2010) that, all other factors being equal, hybrid TJ 
mechanisms tend to work better than either punitive or restorative mechanisms alone.  This is a 
useful finding that suggests that their analysis of TJ mechanisms' effects on human rights and 
democracy improvements can also be extended to the establishment of stable peace.  However, 
the in-depth mini case studies of El Salvador, Rwanda, and Mozambique also show the need for 
caution in drawing bold generalizable conclusions, since all other factors are often not equal, and 
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the political and social context of individual cases have an important role in shaping whether this 
general finding applies to any particular case.  
 The analysis in the preceding article leads to several observations about the way different 
TJ mechanisms are selected and their impact on sustainable peace.  These should be considered 
to be suggestive and helpful in identifying areas for further systematic research, rather than being 
proposed as conclusive prescriptions.  First, the specific TJ mechanisms that are chosen depend 
primarily on political interests, especially of elites who are responsible for negotiating the 
transitional institutions, and on the mechanisms that are 'available' (as a result of demonstration 
effects or technical advice through epistemic communities) in a given society. Second, the 
mechanisms that are available and accessible to post-conflict negotiators and policy 
entrepreneurs are influenced by the rhetorical and symbolic repertoires constructed by a given 
society (and the cultural, historical, religious shared understanding that give these repertoires 
shared meaning).  Third, the availability of these rhetorical/symbolic repertoires are affected by 
the 'distribution of guilt' and relative victimhood of each side.  A conflict in which the 
perpetration of violence was very unbalanced toward one side or the other (or one party can 
persuasively portray itself after the conflict as having been the main victim) can legitimize a 
moral high ground and a discourse of accountability by the side that suffered greater violence.  
This makes it more likely that retributive justice mechanisms are included in the TJ design, and 
that these mechanisms will gain greater acceptance and legitimacy.  If both sides were equally 
implicated in widespread atrocious behavior, it may lead to less emphasis on backward-looking 
accountability, and retributive justice mechanisms are less likely to be perceived as legitimate.  
This is illustrated in the different mechanisms that prevailed in Rwanda, where a genocidal 
massacre was largely carried out by one group against another, and the post-conflict victorious 
power structure was led by the victims (who pushed for retributive mechanisms), in contrast to 
Mozambique, where both sides were implicated in the conflict, the post-conflict government 
relied more on a negotiated settlement, and amnesty was favored above trials.  Of course, the 
power relations between victors and aggressors, and the way that the war ends (i.e. through 
military dominance, negotiated settlement, etc.) also significantly influences whether one party 
has the ability and interest to impose a particular form of transitional justice on the other. 
 Finally, and importantly, whatever the TJ mechanism(s) that are selected, the likelihood 
that they will succeed in producing stable peace in any given case is largely a function of how 
much the interests of elites draw on and 'match' the cultural/contextual factors within the broader 
society.  As Andrea Bartoli argues, the effectiveness of any TJ mechanism depends on "the 
cultural coherence, how much elite and populations speak the same language at the same time, 
and how much the transitional justice that is proposed, pursued, and applied is actually expressed 
in that alignment."  Tying this observation to the post-colonial statebuilding challenge, Bartoli 
observes, "Transitional justice is one of the many instances which a new state formation needs to 
be put together after a fundamental trauma. And so the credibility, the sustainability, the success 
of the formation is clearly dependent on the elite but it’s also dependent on the people and if the 
design is palatable to both...the chances of the strategy to be successful is greater." [16]  
 The expanding activities of international tribunals, and the call to end impunity and 
amnesty, has led to a focus within the international community on the need for retributive justice.  
Yet, as this study shows, such a focus should be balanced with the importance of restorative 
mechanisms for preventing a cycle of vengeance, and this 'justice balance' hybrid approach 
seems to have a greater tendency to produce peace, all other factors being equal.  As the 
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medium-N analysis showed, countries that utilized a hybrid of restorative and retributive justice 
were more likely to have a higher peace sustainability than countries which only utilized one 
mechanism—most commonly, failing to utilize international or criminal prosecution through 
trials.  Such a broad sketch, however, needed further clarification, so the case studies of El 
Salvador, Rwanda, and Mozambique – each representing a paradigmatic example of one of the 
three TJ models – helped to unpack why certain mechanisms worked, and why others did not 
(not just whether or not they worked).  A key insight that also should inform (and caution) 
policymakers and institutional designers is the realization that the cultural context, and the 
resonance of elite interests with widely held norms and narratives, can make all the difference in 
whether a specific TJ mechanism will successfully lead to greater peace: there is no one-size-fits-
all prescription. This article should serve the international community at large and countries 




1. Note, however, that this literature has been criticized by some who say that it overstates the ‘justice 
cascade’ effect by counting the frequency of trials rather than their rate as a proportion of all democratizing 
transitional countries, and that much of the growth is driven by increased democratization, which drives 
movement in all types of transitional justice mechanisms.  See Olsen et al (2010). 
2. Personal interview with Ricardo Lagos, former president of Chile, October 4, 2011, Providence, RI. 
3. This index of political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism “reflects perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism,” and captures the degree of ‘negative peace’ in the various 
countries, averaged over a seven year period between 1997 and 2005.  Since all of these cases had conflicts 
that ended after 1980, the selection of this time frame attempts to measure the effects of TJ across a 
comparable temporal window. 
4. Data is publicly available at https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/. 
5. Payne, Olsen, and Reiter (2010).  The Transitional Justice Database is publicly available at 
http://www.tjdbproject.com/.   
6. It should be noted that peace here is not restricted to democratic regimes per se; yet because of the “voice 
and accountability” measure within the political stability score, the case is made that an oppressive 
authoritarian regime, which was nevertheless politically stable, would still not meet these criteria. 
7. Data is publicly available from the Human Security Index web site: http://www.humansecurityindex.org/ .  
This alternative indicator also allows a check on the longer-term peace and human security in each country, 
as it reflects more recent comparative data as of 2010.   
8. Note that all of the states in this set issued at least some form of amnesty, with no state being listed as 'no 
amnesty'.  Measuring “amnesty” only as “high (number of issuances),” “medium,” or “low” appears to be 
insufficient, since a state could issue amnesty which covered a multitude of people, so the data set also 
includes an asterisk indicating which States had provisions for granting amnesty “to all,” or “to everyone.”  
This asterisk will prove useful in seeing which cases did maintain higher amnesty scores, in addition to the 
calculations just mentioned. 
9. The mean values for states with hybrid forms of transitional justice on the political stability, peacefulness, 
and human security index, are -0.73, 0.08, and 0.56, respectively, while the respective mean values for 
states without hybrid forms are -1.15, -0.12, and 0.49. 
10. It is also important to note that the political terror score measures organized political violence; it does not 
necessarily capture generalized criminal violence.  In other words, it is more a 'negative peace' indicator of 
state-level peace than a 'positive peace' indicator of human security and well-being for individuals in the 
country.  The importance of this caveat can be seen by El Salvador, which has improved its political 
violence score dramatically, but remains with one of the highest levels of criminal violence in the world 
(although this has also improved from its prior levels, as discussed below). 
11. In the 25 cases included in the list here, there is no case that included only trials with no amnesty at all.  
Given this phenomenon, Rwanda was chosen as the paradigmatic case for retributive justice because of its 
substantive focus on trials and rhetorical rejection of amnesty. 
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12. Personal interview with Ruben Zamora Rivas, former presidential candidate of El Salvador, Monterrey, 
Mexico. June 25, 2003. 
13. The gacaca courts were a modification of a traditional form of local justice administered by civilian justices 
of the peace, relying heavily on witness accounts and confessions above investigation and evidence 
collection (Megwalu and Loizides, 2010). 
14. Skype interview with Andrea Bartoli, member of the Community of Sant'Egidio facilitation support team 
for Mozambique.  February 16, 2015. 
15. According to the CIA World Factbook, 56% of the population is Christian (half of these are Catholic), 18% 
is Muslim, and 26% identifies with some other religion or none. 
16. Skype interview with Andrea Bartoli, former member of the Community of Sant'Egidio facilitation support 
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